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We build a three-stage game model of international negotiations
on regulation of global emissions of greenhouse gases, and examine the
Pareto optimality of an equilibrium allocation. First, we derive the
condition for Pareto optimal allocations, which is an extension of the
celebrated Samuelson condition. Next, we show that although pro-
duction eﬃciency of a ﬁnal allocation is always met at an equilibrium
of the game, overall Pareto optimality may not be satisﬁed. This is
because in negotiations on the level of global emissions in the ﬁrst
stage of the game, countries make expectations on the eﬀect of the to-
tal supply of emission permits on the revenue from or the expenditure
for emission permits in a later stage.
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11 Introduction
The Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Cli-
mate Change stipulates the limitation or reduction of greenhouse gas emis-
sions in the developed countries and others for ﬁve years from 2008 to 2012
according to the quantiﬁed commitments. The limitation of greenhouse gas
emissions after this period, however, is not determined yet, and it will soon
become the most important issue of international negotiations. In this paper,
we build a model of international negotiations for reduction of greenhouse
gas emissions with emission permits trading, and examine whether we could
attain a Pareto optimal allocation through the negotiations.
Although every country places a positive value on reduction of greenhouse
gas emissions, marginal willingness to sacriﬁce its own consumption for im-
provement of the environment may vary among countries.1 For such a proﬁle
of welfare functions of the countries over consumption and greenhouse gas
emissions, we ﬁrst derive the condition for the Pareto optimal levels of green-
house gas emissions, production and consumption, which is an extension of
the celebrated Samuelson condition (Samuelson, 1954).
Next, we introduce a three-stage game of international negotiations and
emission permits trading. In the ﬁrst stage, all the countries negotiate on the
total amount of greenhouse gas emission permits, given the distribution rule
of the permits. In the second stage, each country determines its domestic
rule on requirements for emission permits or greenhouse gas taxation. In the
third stage, the market of emission permits is open, and an equilibrium price
of a permit is established. At the equilibrium, each country produces and
consumes commodities, and emits the amount of greenhouse within the limit
determined in the ﬁrst stage. Hence, the total amount of emission permits
determines the equilibrium level of consumption of each country, and thereby
the ﬁnal welfare level of each country.
We analyze carefully how the limitation of the total amount of green-
house gas emissions aﬀects the consumption of each country. In particular,
we take into account the “feedback eﬀect”: an increase in the amount of
emission permits for a country may raise the consumption of the country,
1Ahlheim and Schneider (2002) write “All the more it is amazing that in spite of the
impossibility of personal perception of most greenhouse gases, in many countries people
are ready or eager to make personal sacriﬁces for the sake of greenhouse gas reductions.”
Then they argue why people are willing to sacriﬁce private consumption for environmental
improvements.
2but not as much as the same amount because the increase in consumption
itself accompany greenhouse gas emissions, requiring additional permits.
Based on the analysis, we draw the welfare possibility frontier of the
countries by tracing the welfare vector at each level of the total emission
permits. We show that a welfare vector on the possibility frontier of the
international negotiations is not necessarily Pareto optimal. It is true that
production eﬃciency (or equivalently cost minimization of a given amount of
reduction of greenhouse gases) is ensured through emission permits trading.
In negotiations about the total supply of emission permits, however, the
countries make expectations on the eﬀects of the total supply on the net
revenue from emission permits at market equilibria, a bargaining outcome
may not give rise to a Pareto optimal allocation.
There are some related works on international negotiations for abatement
of global warming. Okada (2003) presents a similar two-stage game model
of international negotiations on emission permits. However, he assumes that
the total amount of emission permits is ﬁxed, and considers negotiations
on distributions of the ﬁxed total amount among countries. Helm (2003)
considers a three-stage game as follows. In the ﬁrst stage, countries decide
whether they establish a regime with permits trading or a regime without
trading by a unanimous agreement. If a trading system is approved, then in
the second stage, each country (as a sovereign state) chooses its own emission
allowances. In the third stage, the allowances are traded in an international
market, and an equilibrium allocation is established. Compared with these
models, the model in this paper has the following characteristics.2 First, we
consider signatories of the Kyoto protocol as the participants in negotiations.
Hence, they have already approved a regime with permits trading, and they
negotiate about a target level of global emissions in the period after 2012,
assuming that emission permits are tradable. Second, a distribution rule
of permits among countries is assumed to be given. There have been long
debates on which distribution rules are fair or just, a proportional rule to past
emissions, to GDPs, to populations, or to the costs of reducing emissions?
Instead of predicting a consequence of these debates on distribution rules,
this paper focuses on negotiations that should follow a settlement of the
debates, and examine whether the countries could succeed in attaining a
2Contributions which shed light on other aspects of international negotiations and
agreements on climate changes are Carraro and Siniscalco (1993), Barrett (1994), Ahlheim
and Schneider (2002), Asako, K. and M. Kuninori (2001), and Lange and Vogt (2003).
3Pareto optimal allocation through negotiations about a target level of global
emissions.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section presents
the basic assumptions on technology and preferences of each country. In sec-
tion 3, we show the extension of the Samuelson condition on Pareto optimal
allocations. In section 4, we present and analyze the three-stage game on
emission permits. Section 5 shows that a bargaining outcome may not give
rise to a Pareto optimal allocation, and section 6 concludes.
2 Technology and Preferences
There are n countries, N = {1,...,n}.L e tyi ∈ R+ denote the gross domestic
product (GDP) of country i ∈ N, ci ∈ R+ the consumption of country i.
Both production and consumption are accompanied by emissions of green-
house gases. Let x
p
i ∈ R+ denote the emission of greenhouse gases from pro-
duction. The relation of x
p




i > 0, f  
i > 0. Let xc
i ∈ R+ be the emission of greenhouse gases
from consumption. The relation of xc
i and ci is represented by the function
xc
i = gi(c), where g 
i > 0, g  
i ≥ 0. Let xi = x
p
i + xc
i be the total emission of
greenhouse gases of country i,a n dl e tX :=

i∈N xi be the global emission
of greenhouse gases.
Each country i has preferences over pairs (ci,X) of its own consumption
and a total amount of emission of greenhouse gases. The preferences are rep-
resented by a continuously diﬀerentiable and strictly quasi-concave function
Vi : R2
+ → R. We call the function Vi the welfare function of country i.
The partial derivative of Vi with respect to the variable a is denoted by
DaVi. We assume that DcVi > 0a n dDXVi < 0. We also assume that
(i) for every ci ∈ R+, limX→0
DXVi(ci,X)
DcVi(ci,X) = 0, and (ii) for every X ∈ r+,
limci→0
DXVi(ci,X)
DcVi(ci,X) = 0. These assumptions mean that the marginal willingness
to sacriﬁce consumption for reduction of greenhouse gas emissions approaches
zero as the level of greenhouse gases goes to zero or as the level of consumption
goes to zero.
43 Pareto optimal allocations
A greenhouse gas is a public “bad” in the sense that an increase in green-
house gas emissions makes every country worse oﬀ. There are several features
of emission of greenhouse gases that are distinct from other public goods or
bads. First, every country emits greenhouse gases inevitably. That is, every
country produces the public bad through both production and consump-
tion of commodities. Second, the relation of emission of greenhouse gases
to production or consumption varies widely among countries, depending on
technology. For instance, to attain a given level of production, Japan emits
a relatively smaller amount of greenhouse gases than Russia, thanks to its
advanced technology to save oil and other resources.
Samuelson (1954) established the celebrated condition of Pareto optimal
allocations in an economy with public goods, saying that at an optimum, the
sum of the marginal rates of substitution between the (composite) commodity
and the public good over all individuals should be equal to the marginal rate
of transformation between the two goods. Next we derive the condition
of the Pareto optimal level of greenhouse gas emissions, taking account of
the essential features of greenhouse gas emissions as described above. Our
condition diﬀers from Samuelson’s condition due to the fact that consumption
of commodities must accompany greenhouse gas emissions. Samuelson did
not consider the case where consumption has such an external eﬀect. Without
the external eﬀect, our condition coincides with Samuelson’s.
An allocation is a vector (y,c,x): =( y1,...,y n;c1,...,c n;x1,...,x n) ∈
R3n






(ii) for every j ∈ N, xj = f(yj)+g(cj).
We say that an allocation (ˆ y,ˆ c, ˆ x) Pareto dominates an allocation (y,c,x)
if and only if
(i) for every j ∈ N, Vj(ˆ cj,

h∈N ˆ xh) ≥ Vj(cj,

h∈N xh), and
(ii) for some j ∈ N, Vj(ˆ cj,

h∈N ˆ xh) >V j(cj,

h∈N xh).
An allocation (y∗,c ∗,x ∗)i sPareto optimal if and only if it is technologi-
cally feasible and there is no technologically feasible allocation that Pareto
dominates it.
Let (y∗,c ∗,x ∗)   0 be a Pareto optimal allocation. For each j ∈ N,




h) ∈ R.L e ti ∈ N be given. Then, (y∗,c ∗,x ∗)i sa














































































i) − δ =0 ( 6 )



































j) − δ =0 ( 9 )
From equations (5) and (7), γi = γj for all i,j ∈ N. Hence, from equations




j) for all i,j ∈ N. Thus, we have the following
result.
6Proposition 1 Production Eﬃciency. At a Pareto optimal allocation,
the marginal emission from production should be the same for all the coun-
tries.
































The value ηi(ci,X) is the absolute value of country i’s marginal rate of sub-


















j)) = 1 (11)
Proposition 2 Extension of the Samuelson Condition. At a Pareto
optimal allocation, the weighted sum of marginal rates of substitution of con-
sumption for global emission of greenhouse gases over all the countries is
equal to one where each weight is the sum of marginal emission from produc-
tion and from consumption in each country.




j) for all i,j ∈ N. Hence, if there is no
external eﬀect of consumption of commodities,t h a ti s ,g 
i =0f o ra l li ∈ N,





















The number t is the marginal rate of transformation between consumption
of commodities and emission of greenhouse gases, and the above equation is
nothing but the celebrated Samuelson condition. In other words, equation
(11) is an extension of the Samuelson condition to the case where consump-
tion of the (composite) commodity has an external eﬀect on the production
of the public bad (or good).
74 Three-stage game on emission permits
In this section, we consider a three-stage game on emission permits. We
assume that that a distribution rule of emission permits among countries
is given. The rule may be the proportional rule to the levels of GDP at a
benchmark year, the proportional rule to populations, or the proportional
rule to the costs of reducing greenhouse gas gases, etc. In the ﬁrst stage,
all the countries negotiate on the total amount of emissions of greenhouse
gases, given the distribution rule of emission permits. In the second stage,
each country determines the domestic rule on the requirement for emission
permits or greenhouse gas taxes. In the third stage, ﬁrms and consumers act
so as to maximize their objectives, and the levels of production, consumption
and emissions of greenhouse gases are determined at a market equilibrium.
4.1 Equilibrium in the market of emission permits
To analyze the game backward, we ﬁrst focus on market equilibria of emission
permits in the third stage of the game. At a given price of the permit, how
is the demand for emission permits determined?
Consider following policies of the government of country i ∈ N.
(A) The government requires that each producer should obtain emission per-
mits at the international price for the amount of greenhouse gases emitted in
the process of production, and that each consumer should also obtain permits
for the amount emitted in the process of consumption of the commodity.
(B) The government imposes the greenhouse gas tax on each producer for
the amount emitted in the process of production, and on each consumer for
the amount emitted in the process of consumption. The tax rate is equal to
the international price of an emission permit.
(C) The government requires that each producer should obtain emission per-
mits at the international price for the amount emitted in the process of
production, and imposes a greenhouse gas tax on each consumer for the
amount emitted in the process of consumption. The tax rate is equal to the
international price of an emission permit.
A point in the three policies is that each producer should be responsible
only for greenhouse gases emitted in the process of production, while each
consumer should be responsible for those emitted in the process of consump-
tion of the product. Later we will see that any of the three policies is an
optimal choice of the government at the second stage.
8Let q ∈ R+ be the international price of an emission permit. Then, the
marginal revenue of production is one since the price of the (composite) com-
modity is one, while the marginal cost of production due to the requirement
for emission permits or the greenhouse gas tax is qf (y) under either of the
policies (A), (B) or (C). Hence, from proﬁt maximization of ﬁrms, the level
of production in country i, y∗





Given a level of production, the level of consumption is determined by
the equivalence between the national income and the national expenditure.3
Let ¯ xi ∈ R+ be the initial assignment of emission permits to country i ∈ N.
Let q ∈ R+ be a given international price of an emission permit. When the
levels of production and consumption are yi and ci, respectively, the total
amount of emissions of greenhouse gases is fi(yi)+gi(ci). Then, the revenue
from (or the expenditure for, if it is negative) emission permits is equal to
q(¯ xi−fi(yi)−gi(ci)). Thus, the national income is given by yi+q(¯ xi−fi(yi)−
gi(ci)). This should be equal to the national expenditure ci. We therefore say
that a consumption-production pair (ci,y i)i sfeasible with emission permits
trading for country i at q and ¯ xi if and only if
ci = yi + q (¯ xi − fi(yi) − gi(ci)). (14)
For each ci ∈ R+,s i n c e1+qg  
i(ci) > 0, by the implicit function theorem,
equation (14) can be locally solved for ci as a function of yi.D e n o t e t h e
function ci(yi). For each yi ∈ R+, ci(yi) ∈ R+ is the level of consumption
when the level of production is yi.
Let us turn to the second stage of the game in which the government
of each country determines the domestic rule on emission permits trading
or greenhouse gas taxes. We assume that for each i ∈ N, the objective of
the government of country i is to maximize its preferences Vi. In the second
stage of the game, however, the government of country i regards the global
emission of greenhouse gases as ﬁxed since it is determined in international
negotiations in the ﬁrst stage. Hence, in order to maximize Vi, it should
choose a policy or a rule that will maximize its domestic consumption in the
third stage.
To ﬁnd such a rule or a policy, it is necessary to examine how the level of
consumption changes as the level of production changes. By diﬀerentiating































If there were no requirement to obtain emission permits, an increase in yi
raises consumption by the same amount. With the requirement for emission
permits, however, a unit of increase in yi induces more payment for emission
permits, and therefore can increase consumption by less than one unit.
Let y∗
i be the level of production of country i that maximizes its own
consumption. By equation (16), c  
i(yi) < 0 whenever c 
i(yi) = 0. Hence, the











In general, one unit of increase in production generates f 
i(yi) units of
emission of greenhouse gases, which increases the payment for (or decreases
the revenue from) emission permits by qf 
i(yi). If consumption also increased,
then more payment for emission permits would be necessary. At the opti-
mum, however, consumption should never increase by the change in produc-
tion. Hence, the increase in production should be just oﬀset by the increase
in the payment for (or the decrease in the revenue from) emission permits
from production. That is why qf 
i(yi) = 1 and equation (17) hold at the
optimal production y∗
i.
However, as one notice by comparing equation (17) with equation (13),
the optimal amount y∗
i is exactly the amount of production attained through
proﬁt maximization of ﬁrms under any of the policies (A), (B) and (C).
Therefore, to choose any of the three policies is indeed an optimal choice of
the government in the second stage of the game.
Proposition 3 Consider country i ∈ N. In the second stage of the game,
any of the three policies (A), (B) and (C) is an optimal choice of the govern-
ment of country i whose objective is to maximize the preferences Vi.U n d e r
10the policy, and at any given price of emission permit, the amount of produc-
tion y∗







Then the amount of consumption ci(y∗
i) is the maximal amount under the
price q and the initial assignment ¯ xi of emission permits.






q for all i,j ∈ N. Hence,
we obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 1 Any allocation attained in the third stage of the game satisﬁes
the condition of production eﬃciency.
4.2 The demand function for emission permits
Having examined how the production and the consumption of country i are
determined in the third stage of the game, this subsection studies the prop-
erty of the demand function for emission permits of country i.T h a ti s ,w e
investigate how the demand for emission permits changes as the price of a
permit changes.
For every q ∈ R+,l e tyi(q) ∈ R+ be the amount of production of country
i at q in the third stage of the game. Since f  (yi) > 0 for all yi ∈ R+,t h e
function 1






i(q) is the emission from production of country
i at q. Deﬁne xc
i(q): =gi(ci(yi(q))). xc
i(q) is the emission from consumption
of country i at q.L e txi(q): =x
p
i(q)+xc
i(q). Then, xi(q) is the gross demand
for emission permits of country i at q.
We would like to examine whether the gross demand for emission permits
is decreasing in q or not. As we have already seen, if q rises, then yi(q)
decreases, and hence x
p
i(q) also decreases. We need to check whether xc
i(q)
is decreasing in q or not.
By deﬁnition, for all q ∈ R++,


















Since 1 − qf 







i(q)=¯ xi − fi(yi(q)) − gi(ci(yi(q)))





















i(ci) > 0 for all ci ∈ R+, it follows that
dc
dq













This means that if country i is a net supplier of emission permits, then
an increase in the price q induces higher consumption through the income
eﬀect, which then raises the emission from consumption, xc
i.T h a ti s ,xc
i(q)
is increasing in q. Therefore, it is ambiguous whether the total demand for
emission permits of country i, xi(q)=x
p
i(q)+xc




 (q)| < |xc
i
 (q)|, then the total demand is increasing in q.




 (q)a n dxc
i
 (q) are negative. Thus, the total demand for emission
permits of country i is decreasing in q.
What about the aggregate demand for emission permits? Let XD(q)
denote the aggregate demand for emission permits at q.S i n c e xi(q)m a y
be increasing or decreasing in q for each i ∈ N, it is ambiguous in general
whether the aggregate demand XD(q) is decreasing in q or not. However,
under an additional assumption, we can determine the sign of XD (q) at an
equilibrium price.
Assumtion L (Linearity in Emission from Consumption):
For some constant α ∈ R++, gi(ci)=αci for all i ∈ N.
12Assumption L means that (i) emissions from consumption are propor-
tional to the levels of consumption, and (ii) per unit emissions from con-
sumption are the same among countries. While the relations of emissions of
greenhouse gases with production vary widely among countries, depending
on the production technologies to save energies, emissions from consumption
may be nearly proportional to the amount of consumption, and moreover,
the diﬀerences among countries in per unit emissions from consumption seem
small. For example, emissions of greenhouse gases from cooking, heating,
driving, exercising, etc., would be proportional to the amount of consump-
tion, and there is little diﬀerence in per unit emissions among countries.






































































Let q∗ ∈ R+ be an equilibrium price of the emission permit when the total
supply of emission permits is a given ¯ X ∈ R+. Then,

i∈N





























Thus, we have established the following proposition.
13Proposition 4 Let q∗ ∈ R+ be an equilibrium price of the emission permit.
Under Assumption L, the aggregate demand function for emission permits is
decreasing in a small neighborhood of q∗.
4.3 Maximization of preferences of each country in in-
ternational negotiations
The previous subsection showed the property of the aggregate demand func-
tion for emission permits. Based on the property, this subsection examines
how the equilibrium consumption of each country changes as the total supply
of emission permits changes. This reveals a trade-oﬀ between reduction of
greenhouse gases and consumption of each country. Then, for each country,
the condition for an optimal amount of total supply of emission permits is
determined, taking the trade-oﬀ into account.
Let q(X) be the equilibrium price when the total supply of emission
permits is X. It follows form Proposition 4 that q (X) < 0 under Assumption
L.
In the ﬁrst stage of the game, each country claims how much the total
supply of emission permits should be. Each country tries to maximize its
preferences Vi(ci,X), taking account of the fact that, once the total supply
X is determined in the ﬁrst stage, the production and the consumption of
country i are determined at the equilibrium price q(X) in the ﬁnal stage.
We assume that the assignment of emission permits to each country is
proportional to the total supply of emission permits. Let (θ1,...,θ n) ∈]0,1[n
with

i∈N θi = 1 be the proportional factors.
If a total supply of emission permits X is given, then the equilibrium
price, the production level and the consumption level of each country i are
determined, which then determines the welfare level of country i. Hence, the
welfare of each country is a function of X.
With slight abuse of notation, let ci(X) be the consumption level of coun-









A change in the total supply of emission permits, X, aﬀects the welfare
of country i through two routes: one is the direct eﬀect represented by
14DXVi(ci,X), and the other is the indirect eﬀect through the change in con-
sumption, DcVi(ci,X)c 
i(X). To examine how the consumption changes with
a change in X, notice ﬁrst that by feasibility,



















The terms of equation (22) represent the following eﬀects of an increase in
X on ci.
(i) y 
i(q)q (X) > 0 : the increase in production due to the fall in q.
(ii) q (X)[θiX − fi(yi) −gi(ci)]: the change in revenue from (or the payment
for) emission permits due to the fall in q. If country i is a net supplier of
emission permits, then q (X)[θiX − fi(yi) − gi(ci)] < 0, and if it is a net
demander, q (X)[θiX − fi(yi) − gi(ci)] > 0.
(iii) q(X)θi > 0: the increase in the revenue from (or the decrease in payment
for) emission permits due to the increase in the initial assignment of emission
permits to country i.
(iv) −q(X)[f 
i(yi)y 
i(q)q (X)] < 0 : the decrease in the revenue from (or the




i(X)]: the change in the revenue from (or the payment for)
emission permits due to the change in emission through consumption.
By Proposition 3, q(X)f (yi(q(X))) = 1. Hence, the eﬀect (i) is just oﬀset
by the eﬀect (iv). This is because each country maximizes its consumption








The value c 
i(X) may be called the marginal opportunity cost of reduction of
greenhouse gases for country i in terms of its own consumption under the
system of emission permits trade.










i be the amount of total supply of emission permits that is optimal
for country i,a n dl e ty∗
i := yi(q(X∗
i )) and c∗
i := ci(X∗
i ). If X =0 ,t h e nci =0 ,
which is clearly not optimal for country i. Hence, X∗




















Let us summarize the analysis as follows.
Proposition 5 Suppose that the initial assignments of emission permits to
the countries are proportional to the total supply X.L e tX∗
i be the amount
of the total supply of emission permits that maximizes the welfare of country
i,a n dl e tc∗
i be the level of consumption at q(X∗
i ).A t(c∗
i,X∗
i ),c o u n t r yi’s
marginal rate of substitution of its own consumption for global emission of
greenhouse gases is equal to country i’s marginal opportunity cost of reduction
of greenhouse gases in terms of its own consumption under the system of











where θi ∈]0,1[ is the proportion of the initial assignment of emission permits
to country i.
5 Non-optimality of bargaining outcomes
As the analyses in the previous sections have shown, once the amount of the
total supply of emission permits is determined in international negotiations in
the ﬁrst stage, an equilibrium price of the emission permit is established in the
market of emission permits, which then determines the level of consumption
of each country. Hence, the welfare level of each country depends solely on
the total supply of emission permits. In other words, by tracing the vector
of welfare levels attained by all the countries at each amount of the total
supply of emission permits, we can draw the welfare possibility frontier in
the international negotiations. This gives the set of feasible welfare vectors
in the theory of bargaining ` a la Nash (1950), and by applying one of various
bargaining solutions proposed in the literature, we may predict the outcome
of the international negotiations.
16However, as shown next, vectors on the welfare possibility frontier in
these international negotiations are not necessarily Pareto optimal. That is,
there exists a technologically feasible allocation for which the welfare of every
country is at least as good as at the vector on the frontier, and the welfare
of some country is strictly higher. We show this fact by focusing on the the
level of the total supply of emission permits that maximizes the welfare of
one country. Such a level of the total supply clearly supports a welfare vector
on the frontier, but the associated allocation is not Pareto optimal except
for a rare case. We ﬁrst consider the rare case, and then the general case.
Proposition 6 For each i ∈ N,l e tX∗
i be the amount of total supply of
emission permits that maximizes the welfare of country i. Under Assumption
L, if X∗
i = X∗
j := X∗ for all i,j ∈ N, then the allocation attained at X∗ is
Pareto optimal.











i are consumption and production of country i achieved at






















































q(X∗) = f 
i(y∗
i) for all i ∈ N. Notice also that α = g 
i(c∗
i)















17Proposition 7 Let N = {1,2}.F o r e a c h i ∈ N,l e tX∗
i be the amount
of total supply of emission permits that maximizes the welfare of country
i. Under Assumption L, if X∗
1  = X∗
2, then for each i ∈ N, the allocation
attained at X∗
i is not Pareto optimal.










































































6C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper we have examined how eﬀective an international cooperation
would be for abatement of global warming. First, we have derived the con-
dition for Pareto optimal allocations, which is an extension of the celebrated
Samuelson condition to the case of greenhouse gas emissions. Second, we
have built a three-stage game of international negotiations on regulation of
global emissions with emission permits trading, and examined whether a ﬁ-
nal allocation is Pareto optimal or not. We have shown that production
18eﬃciency of a ﬁnal allocation is always met at an equilibrium of the game.
This is because once a level of global emission is determined by international
negotiations in the ﬁrst stage of the game, the government of each country
chooses its domestic rule on emissions so as to maximize the amount of its
own consumption in the second stage of the game, and ﬁrms act as proﬁt-
maximizers in the third stage. However, we have also shown that overall
Pareto optimality of a ﬁnal allocation may not be satisﬁed. The reason is
because in international negotiations in the ﬁrst stage of the game, coun-
tries take account of the eﬀect of the total supply of emission permits on the
revenue from or the expenditure for emission permits.
There are some limits to the analysis in this paper. First, we assume
that an initial distribution rule of emission permits among countries is given.
Though the total emissions of greenhouse gases determine the speed of global
warming, it is also an important issue how the total emission permits should
be distributed initially. Second, we ﬁx the participants (signatories of the
Kyoto protocol) in negotiations, and ignore the behavior of non-participants
(non-signatories). In fact, before starting negotiations there should be an-
other stage in which each country decides whether it participates in the
mechanism or not. To develop a more comprehensive model which takes
account of these factors is left for future researches.
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